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Abstract—Enforcing security in location based services is
very crucial in the current mobile world. Past literature has
examined both location and identity obfuscation techniques
in order to optimally tradeoff security/privacy with utility −
this primarily addresses the ‘how to enforce location security
problem’; however, it does not address the ‘where to enforce
location security problem’. This paper examines the ‘where’
problem and in particular, examines tradeoffs between enforcing
location security at a device vs. enforcing location security at an
edge location server. This paper also sketches an implementation
of location security solutions at both the device and the edge
location server and presents detailed experiments using real
mobility and user profile data sets collected from various data
sources (taxicabs, Smartphones). Our results show that while
device-based solutions do not require trust in the edge location
server, they either suffer from high false positive rate (about 25%
probability of not meeting the desired security requirement) or
low utility (about 600 meters higher error in obfuscated location
data).
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become an important tool in modern
communication. Mobile and other handheld devices such as
ipads and tablets have over taken laptops and desktops and
hence there has been an increasing research interest in this
area in recent years. This includes improving the quality of
communication and the overall end-to-end data security in day-
to-day transactions. Mobile devices can request for location
based services from service providers. This leads to various
attacks made in order to tamper the end user security. Hence
end user security is another major issue along with the data
security flowing from one end to the other. On requesting
a service from a mobile service provider, the location and
identity of the individual making the request is unknowingly
accessed by the Service Provider leading to taking advantages
and misusing it. Hence preserving the security of the individual
including location and identity is a very difficult open research
problem today.
One of the approaches is to ensure the location security and
the other is through identity security. Both these techniques
are equally important as either of them can compromise the
security in the mobile space. There is a vast body of work in
the area of location security [8] [3] [6] [2] [4] [12] [1] and
[7]. But there is no thorough evaluation on where to enforce
location security and what are the tradeoffs involved. There
are two approaches for information flow control in mobile
environments.
It is very important to understand the placement of the
location security solution and where to enforce security is key
Fig. 1: A tactical network scenario enabling efficient computations
over dynamic networks
to this paper. Introducing mobile micro-cloud in this paper will
help in understanding the placement of the solution. Mobile
micro-cloud [11] envisions that applications (or computing
tasks) will be deployed in a mobile micro-cloud, a logical
network composed of two components, the core (e.g., the
command and control center) with access to large quantities
of static (and possibly stale) information and the edge (e.g.,
the forward operating base) with access to smaller quantities
of more real-time and dynamic data. The edge and core are
separated by dynamic and performance constrained networks
with a many-to-one relationship between the core and the
edge. It is also possible for edge nodes to communicate with
each other. Further, the (edge and core) nodes can belong to
different coalition partners, raising the question of security
and operational policies for handling of data and computation.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical architecture of the mobile micro-
cloud in the army coalition context. The benefits of embedding
storage and computation into such a micro-cloud tactical
network are two fold: (i) Effective provisioning for diverse
information requirements the micro- cloud supports users
with different latency requirements and access rights and (ii)
Effective information exchange in a constrained environment
Complete shuffling of information is impractical in a tactical
network and the micro-cloud reduces congestion by providing
computation at the edge.
This paper focuses on Device Vs Edge based implemen-
tation and the tradeoffs in them. This paper quantifies the
tradeoffs and proves that edge based solution is the better
solution for enforcing security. Our results show that while
device-based solutions do not require trust in the edge loca-
tion server, they either suffer from high false positive rate
(about 25% probability of not meeting the desired security
requirement) or low utility (about 600 meters higher error in
obfuscated location data).
Solution at the Core
The core is the centralised network and hence has a lot of
bandwidth and can maintain huge repository of information.
It also has a lot of computational power allowing it to process
2complex solutions. It is important to note that it takes longer
time for transactions to work between the device and the core.
This is a major drawback to the location based solution as
decisions needs to be made rapidly else will lead to delays
in the decisions to be taken and hence weakens the system.
Solution at the core will retain same false positive and false
negative and will have a very high latency.
Solution on the Device
The delays caused due the solution being placed at the core
of the network gave rise to the new wave of solutions that were
placed on the device. It is important to notice that the device
doesn’t have a lot of flexibility, bandwidth, computation power.
Besides any of these, the device does not have visibility of the
other devices in the network. Hence any kind of computations
performed by the device will not be leading to accurate results.
It could very well lead to misleading answers to the user’s
request.
This leads us to the new methodology that we introduce in
this paper called the solution at the edge of the network.
Solution at the Edge
The edge of the network is closer to the device and is
an intermediate channel between the device and the core of
the network. The edge has visibility of all the other users in
the network and the edge can perform computations faster
and provide with results spontaneously to the device. The
advantage of having the solution at the edge is that edge
will have information about other people and hence solution
will have lower false positive and lower false negative. The
only catch with this solution is that trust with the edge is
needed. The edge will have the raw obfuscated data or slightly
obfuscated location data . Latency with this solution is higher
than device based solution and is lower that the solution at the
core. This helps the device user make decisions on the location
based service requests that one has. Hence this solution is the
best solution compared to the 3 solutions explained in this
paper.
In this paper we compare optimal choice on the device
(based on historical data) with optimal choice on the edge and
examines the tradeoffs between enforcing location security at
a device vs. enforcing location security at an edge location
server. To the best of our knowledge this the first attempt to
quantify the effectiveness gap between the optimal solution at
the device versus that at the edge/core.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section I
provides a brief introduction to location and identity security
solution placement. Section II describes location security and
k-anonymity. Section III shows the evaluation of the location
information flow control with datasets. Section IV describes
an implementation of the device and edge based solution and
shows the comparison between the two solutions. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. LOCATION SECURITY
Location Security mainly deals with the location of the
requester. In mobile environments, users requests for infor-
mation related to location ever so often during requesting
location based services. For example, when the user requests
nearby restaurant information from the location based server,
the location based server needs to know the location of the
user and hence the location information is normally requested.
However, in most of the cases, the user doesnt want to disclose
the location information to arbitrary location based service
providers. This can be achieved by a number of different
mechanisms. One of the well known methods is k-anonymity.
In this method, users location information is updated with
pseudo-ids and then the generalized location information is
sent to the location based service provider. Due to some
groups being created that fail to provide overall anonymity,
another mechanism called s-proximity has been implemented
[3] . This mechanism creates a larger number of anonymous
user profiles to ensure that the location based service provider
cannot identify the location of the requestor. Another location
Security mechanism that is described is Casper [6] . Casper is a
combination of location anonymizer and Security aware query
processor. Few other mechanisms like the Encrypted data store
[8], key agreement [5], privacy tools [9]; In-device spatial
cloaking assisted by cloud [10] is also part of the location
security.
k-anonymity is a well known metric that is used for
quantifying location security in mobile environments. Identity
obfuscation is equally important when mobile device users
are requesting for location based services. The location and
identity are both being captured by the service providers in
order to provide the user with the accurate results to the
query. Hence it is very important to obfuscate both the identity
and location so that the security is enforced but accurately
providing the same set of results to the query.
This paper describes the implications of location security
solution placement at the core, edge and device. It also
presents experimentation results based on taxi cab, cellular
and Watson datasets indicating the performance of the solution
thus proving that location security is best placed at the edge
of the network using a trusted edge server.
III. SECURITY METRICS
In this section we present an empirical evaluation of the
proposed location information flow control solution. Figure 2
shows a summary of the datasets used for evaluation. Three
of the datasets Shanghai, San Francisco and Stockholm
are taxicab traces obtained from the respective cities. The
fourth (Cellular) is a user location trace and URL accesses
obtained from a cellular network. The fifth (Watson) is an
enterprise dataset obtained from WiFi location traces and URL
accesses.
In the Shanghai and San Francisco datasets, there are
explicit markers that indicate when the taxicab is occupied; in
the Stockholm dataset collection of location trace is turned
off when the taxicab is occupied (i.e., we only have trajectory
information when the taxicab is not occupied). We use these
datasets to quantify tradeoffs between the extent of obfuscation
and anonymity.
In addition to these datasets, we use coarse grained mobility
data from 16K mobile users obtained from CDRs (Call Detail
3Records) and from about 1.2K enterprise users obtained from
WiFi and web data accesses. While a taxicab’s trajectory
may be viewed as a mixture of several user trajectories (i.e.,
multiple passenger trajectories), this dataset captures move-
ment information at the granularity of each user. However,
location information is captured is at the level of cellular
Basestation association, which depending upon urban/rural
areas can range from a few 100 meters to about 5,000 meters.
From a population of about 11.6M users, we selected about
16K users that had more than 400 CDRs per day (i.e., >400
location samples and data accesses per day). While we use
the taxicab dataset to analyze fine grained trajectories (each
corresponding to one trip), we use the cellular and enterprise
dataset to analyze mobility across multiple trips undertaken by
a single user.
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 show the average anonymity as the
extent of obfuscation is varied for times 7am-10am, 10am-
4pm, 4pm-7pm and 7pm-7am respectively. As the extend of
obfuscation is increased so does the extent of anonymity;
further anonymity is generally higher during busy hours in
the morning and the evening because several mobile users
are active within a small spatial extent. The key challenge
in practice is that these measures of anonymities are averages
over the respective dataset. Hence, given a user location at
a point in date and time, the challenge is to identify the
amount of obfuscation required to can achieve a desired level
of anonymity.
Figure 7 shows the number of users on the y-axis and
similarity on x-axis. A point (x, y) in the figure indicates that
there are at least y users whose profiles have a similarity of
at least x with a randomly selected user. Similarity between
user profiles is computed using a cosine distance on the set
of URLs (web pages) accessed by a user with that of another
user.
Fig. 7: Similarity of user profiles (based on data accesses)
Figures 8, 9, 10 show the complexity of a device-based
model and false positive and false negative rates in enforcing
the desired level of anonymity. A choice of obfuscation k is
said to result in a false positive if it results in cloaking < k
users; and in a false negative if it results in cloaking ≥ k users.
A false negative is an indicator of over obfuscation which
would in turn affect the utility of the obfuscated data; while a
false positive is in direct violation of the k-anonymity security
requirement. In order to determine the level of obfuscation
we analyze historical data using decision tree based machine
learning algorithms − parameterized by location (typically
encoded as latitude/longitude boxes) and timestamps (typically
time of day and week). We tradeoff model complexity (i.e.,
number of nodes in the decision tree) with accuracy (i.e.,
being able to predict the desired level of obfuscation). We
observe that increasing model complexity beyond a desired
level increases the error primarily due to over fitting. We
observe that in most cases the false positive and false negative
rate of an optimal device-based algorithm (with large model
complexity) varies between 0.12 and 0.25 for our datasets.
This captures the extent of sub-optimality in a device-based
solutions in comparison with an edge-based solution.
Figure 11, 12, 13 show the false positive rate (i.e., the odds
of not meeting the desired level of anonymity) and location
error. Location error is only computed when the choice of
obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity. If the choice
of obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity and
nothing more than location error is zero. Otherwise, location
error is computed as the difference between the extent of
obfuscation chosen and the optimal obfuscation needed to
achieve the desired level of anonymity.
Figure 14, 15, 16 shows the false positive rate (i.e., the
probability of not meeting the desired level of anonymity)
and location error with and without consideration to user
similarity respectively. For this experiment the desired level of
anonymity k = 16 and the desired level of user similarity is 0.0
(first case that ignores user profiles), 0.7 (in the second case)
and 0.9 (in the third case). For instance when user similarity
threshold is 0.7, amongst the set of users that are within
the extent of obfuscation only those users whose profiles are
at least 70% similar to the given user are considered for
quantification of anonymity. This figure shows the additional
cost (higher false positive rate and higher location error) that
is incurred when enforcing location security based on profile
cloning. We observe that when the similarity threshold is low
the device-based solution pays a high penalty in terms of
location error, while when the threshold is high the device-
based solution pays a higher penalty in terms of false positive
rate (i.e., the inability to meet the security requirement).
Figure 17, 18, 19 show the false positive rate (i.e., the
odds of not meeting the desired level of anonymity) and
location error while requiring a user similarity threshold of
0.7. Profiles for entities are drawn at random from the Watson
dataset with the goal of showcasing tradeoffs between location
security and identity/profile based obfuscation. Similar to prior
experiments, location error is only computed when the choice
of obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity. If the
choice of obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity and
nothing more than location error is zero. Otherwise, location
error is computed as the difference between the extent of
obfuscation chosen and the optimal obfuscation needed to
achieve the desired level of anonymity.
IV. ANDROID BASED IMPLEMENTATION
This work has been implemented as an android based
system. An application has been implemented in the android
device in order to showcase the difference in the 2 methodolo-
gies. The solution at the device and the solution at the edge
4Characteristic Shanghai San Francisco Stockholm Cellular Watson
Sampling rate 2/min 12/min 1/min >400/day all web accesses
Number of entities ∼ 10,000 ∼ 500 ∼ 2000 ∼ 16,000 ∼1200
Source type GPS GPS GPS Cellular Basestation WiFi
association
Privacy None None No sampling Coarse grained None
when taxi hired samples
Timeline 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month
Total number of trips 1,335,360 26,767 570,690 55,200 -
Total number of web accesses - - - 12.4M 5.6M
Fig. 2: Summary of datasets
Fig. 3: 7-10am Fig. 4: 10am-4pm Fig. 5: 4-7pm Fig. 6: 7pm-7am
Fig. 8: Shanghai Fig. 9: Stockholm Fig. 10: San Francisco
Fig. 11: Shanghai Fig. 12: Stockholm Fig. 13: San Francisco
have been implemented using an example of the London Boris
bikes. Boris bikes are the easiest way to hire a cycle, ride it
where you like and return it to any docking station. In this
implementation, we have shown the means of how the system
solution works when the solution is at the edge and when
its at the device. In order to perform the implementation, we
have made use of an application in an android device and then
have implemented an edge server on a windows server. This
server behaves as an edge which has the visibility to all the
devices in the network and perform computations accordingly.
The device based solution shows an android application with
the map of London in it indicating the boris bikes available
for hire. Request from the mobile device is shown on the
map by indicating the current location of the device. By
performing obfuscation on the device, it can be noticed that
the obfuscation is not accurate enough as the device does not
have visibility to other devices in the network. When the user
then makes a request for the bikes, the responses received are
not accurate due to the drawback of inaccurate obfuscation.
In the case of solution at the edge, the edge has visibility to
all the devices. When the user makes a request asking for the
nearest bike hire from the current location, the edge takes care
of obfuscating the current location of the device in comparison
with the other devices in the network who would have made
similar requests. The request is then sent from the obfuscated
location and this results in accurate responses for the user
requesting the locations of the bikes nearby from his location.
Figures show the different stages in the demonstration of the
location based request with the anonymised location and the
results of the query. The solution has been implemented using
the Eclipse development kit and has been tested with real use
case scenarios. Figure 20 shows the device based solution
5Fig. 14: Cellular: Sim Thr 0.0 Fig. 15: Cellular: Sim Thr 0.7 Fig. 16: Cellular: Sim Thr 0.9
Fig. 17: Shanghai: Sim Thr 0.7 Fig. 18: Stockholm: Sim Thr 0.7 Fig. 19: San Francisco: Sim Thr 0.7
Fig. 20: Deviced based solution view of the London Thames
region
Fig. 21: Search results for the device based solution
Fig. 22: Devices that are visible to the edge server Fig. 23: Query results from true and obfuscated location
6where user clicks on a particular point and then checks are
done to see if the chosen location has enough obfuscation.
Device level obfuscation cannot be performed as the device
has no visibility to the other devices. Hence checks are done
at the edge server to ensure that the obfuscation is good enough
to make a query. Figure 21 shows the search results for boris
bike using the device based solution. Figure 22 shows the view
that the edge server would have of all the devices. Since the
server can see all the devices, when a device makes a request
for the bikes, the server can obfuscate the location based on
the other devices in the area. On searching for the bikes based
on the new obfuscated location, the results are displayed in
figure 23. The comparison of results based on the search from
the true location and the obfuscated location is shown using
the 2 circles. This proves that the edge server functions close
enough to the query made directly to the Boris bikes provider
without any obfuscation.
V. SUMMARY
This paper builds upon the vast literature in location
anonymity by investigating a large unexplored facet of this
problem − where to enforce location security and what are
the tradeoffs in doing so? We have explored both device and
edge based enforcement of location security and quantified the
gap between optimal device-based enforcement with that of
the edge-based enforcement. In particular, we have identified
machine learning algorithms that determine the extent of
location obfuscation that is needed to achieve a desired level
of anonymity. We have shown that even with good models a
device based solution (that is unaware of the instantaneous lo-
cations of other entities or their profiles) is largely suboptimal
in determining extent of location obfuscation. Our experiments
on various mobility datasets show that device-based solutions
either suffer from high false positive rate (about 25% chance
of not meeting the desired security requirement) or low utility
(about 600 meters higher error in obfuscated location data).
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